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Under the principle of stare decisis, courts typically rely on prior case law 
as precedent when making their decisions.1  However, the Supreme Court has 
also looked at the historical and administrative practices of the executive when 
making their decisions—what has been referred to as “non-judicial precedent” 
or “custom.”2  Here, “custom” refers to a historical practice of the executive or 
legislative branch and knowing acquiescence in that practice by the other 
branch—an interaction that creates customary law.3  In this sense, custom is a 
 
 1. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 8 (2008).  Stare decisis is “the 
Latin phrase for ‘to stand by things decided.’”  Id.  Lawyers use this phrase as “shorthand for 
either the Court’s basic respect for its prior decisions or the basic principle that legal reasoning 
should be consistent with judicial precedent.”  Id. 
 2. Michael J. Gerhardt, Non-Judicial Precedent, 61 VAND. L. REV. 713, 715 (2008).  
Gerhardt defines “non-judicial precedents as any past constitutional judgments of non-judicial 
actors that courts or other public authorities imbue with normative authority.”  Id.  For Gerhardt, 
these include historical practices, which “usually refer to the federal government’s longstanding 
or past exercises of powers over certain domains,” custom, which “refers to institutional or 
cultural habits and conventions,” and administrative practices, which “entail agencies’ 
constructions of ambiguous federal statutes.”  Id. at 748–49. 
 3. Commentators have labeled the general pattern of historical practice by one branch of 
government and acquiescence in that practice by another branch a variety of terms.  See, e.g., 
HAROLD H. BRUFF, BALANCE OF FORCES: SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW IN THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 66, 102 (2006) (referring to a “‘Madisonian’ acquiescence doctrine” that 
has “given us a kind of constitutional common law” which can “gloss the Constitution” and 
“alter[] the apparent meaning of a statute”); Peter Raven-Hansen & William C. Banks, Pulling 
the Purse Strings of the Commander in Chief, 80 VA. L. REV. 833, 848–54 (1994) (describing a 
“customary national security law” that “evidences the political branches’ joint interpretation of 
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source of law that the Supreme Court has relied on throughout its history.4  The 
creation of this customary law occurs most frequently when the Court has 
interpreted congressional statutes that delegate broad authority to the executive 
branch.5  This has been especially evident in Supreme Court cases that concern 
national security and foreign affairs.6 
Relying on this Supreme Court precedent, custom has been invoked as a 
source of legal authority in the national security context since 9/11.  In Al-
Bihani v. Obama, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals invoked custom as a 
source of law when interpreting the September 2001 Authorization for Use of 
Military Force7 (hereinafter “AUMF”).8  In Al-Bihani, the court considered 
whether past executive practice concerning wartime detention applied to the 
detention of Al-Bihani, a Guantanamo Bay detainee.9  In testimony before 
Congress, others have asserted that the executive branch practice of “targeted 
 
the President’s constitutional or statutory authority”); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 70 (1990) 
(describing a “quasi-constitutional custom” generated by the historical interaction of two or more 
federal branches).  While the executive can also acquiesce in a legislative practice, the focus in 
this Comment is on congressional acquiescence in executive branch practice. 
 4. See Gerhardt, supra note 2, at 749–54 (collecting cases); DAVID J. BEDERMAN, CUSTOM 
AS A SOURCE OF LAW 108–112 (2010) (same); Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom in 
Resolving Separation of Powers Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REV. 109, 115–16 (1984) (same); see also 
cases discussed infra Part I.  This use of “custom” is also distinguishable from customary 
international law (hereinafter “CIL”).  CIL is an international common law that is a body of rules 
and principles said to arise informally from the general and consistent practice of nations.  See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1986).  
Evidence of CIL includes judgments and opinions of international tribunals, such as the 
International Court of Justice, judgments and opinions of other nations’ judicial tribunals, and 
scholarly writings.  Id. § 103.  The idea behind custom as a source of international law “is that 
states in and by their international practice may implicitly consent to the creation and application 
of international legal rules.”  MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 42–
43 (3d ed. 1999). 
 5. See BRUFF, supra note 3, at 102–05; Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 3, at 849–50. 
 6. See cases discussed infra Part I. 
 7. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) 
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 cmt. (2006)).  The AUMF was Congress’ response to 
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.  The text of the AUMF provides in pertinent part: 
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those 
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided 
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations 
or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United 
States by such nations, organizations or persons. 
Id. § 2(a), 115 Stat. at 224. 
 8. 590 F.3d 866, 870–73 (D.C. Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc denied, 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1841 (2011). 
 9. Id. 
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killings”10 by drones has strong legal authority in both the “domestic 
customary law of anticipatory self-defense” and in Congress’ broad 
delegations of authority in the AUMF and the National Security Act of 1947.11  
These congressional delegations have permitted Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) practices, such as targeted killing, with which Congress has 
acquiesced.12  Also, Harold Koh, Legal Adviser to the U.S. Department of 
State, stated that government lawyers should first look to “Executive Branch 
precedent” when researching issues, including those related to detentions and 
targeted killing.13 
These invocations of custom as a source of law by the Al-Bihani court, by 
those testifying before Congress, and by the U.S. Department of State Legal 
Adviser raise several questions: How has custom been used as a source of 
decisional authority by the Supreme Court?  How did the Al-Bihani court use 
custom when interpreting the AUMF?  Is custom a valid source of legal 
authority when considering other broad delegations of congressional authority, 
such as the National Security Act of 1947?  What are some of the implications 
 
 10. In this Comment, “targeted killing” refers to the CIA and U.S. military practice of 
utilizing unmanned drones to kill persons suspected of terrorism in different countries (e.g., 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen).  See Scott Shane, C.I.A. is Disputed on Civilian Toll in 
Drone Strikes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2011, at A1 (noting that “drone aircraft deployed in Pakistan 
are the leading edge of a revolution in robotic warfare that has already expanded to Yemen and 
Somalia, and that military experts expect to sweep the world”); Adam Entous, Julian E. Barnes & 
Siobhan Gorma, CIA Escalates in Pakistan, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2010, at A1; Jane Mayer, The 
Predator War: What Are the Risks of the C.I.A.’s Covert Drone Program?, NEW YORKER, Oct. 
26, 2009, at 36.  This definition is in line with a U.N. Human Rights Council Report which refers 
to targeted killing as the “intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force, by States or 
their agents acting under colour of law, or by an organized armed group in armed conflict, against 
a specific individual who is not in the physical custody of the perpetrator.”  Special Rapporteur 
on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Study on Targeted Killings, U.N. Human 
Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston). 
 11. Rise of the Drones II: Examining the Legality of Unmanned Targeting: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec. and Foreign Affairs of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 
112th Cong. 40 (2010) (testimony of William C. Banks, Prof., Syracuse Law School) [hereinafter 
Legality of Drones Hearings]. 
 12. Id. at 40–41. 
 13. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Address at the Annual Meeting 
of the American Society of International Law: The Obama Administration and International Law 
(Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm.  Koh further 
indicated that the Obama administration finds legal authority for targeted killings by relying on 
both the authority of the AUMF and “when acting in self-defense” under domestic law and 
international laws of war.  Id.  It has also been argued that under the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct it is permissible for government lawyers to cite “customary national security law” as an 
alternative source of legal authority when advising President Obama.  Peter Margulies, Changing 
of the Guard: The Obama Administration, National Security, and the Ethics of Legal Transitions 
25 (Roger Williams Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 
95, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1673989. 
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for the executive branch’s current practice of targeted killings in Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and Yemen?14  This Comment addresses these questions by 
analyzing the use of custom as a source of legal authority by the Supreme 
Court and through application of those Court decisions to Al-Bihani and the 
executive practice of targeted killing. 
Part I discusses the Supreme Court precedent relied on by the Al-Bihani 
court, and other commentators, when citing custom as a source of law.  These 
cases indicate precedential authority for using custom when interpreting 
congressional action and inaction.  Based on this precedent, the appropriate use 
of custom as a source of law requires the executive practice in question to be 
(1) long-continued, systematic, and unbroken; and (2) Congress’ knowing 
acquiescence in that practice.15 
Part II begins with a summary of the Supreme Court precedent discussed 
in Part I.  These cases are also critiqued for the inconsistencies within this body 
of law.  Next, the Al-Bihani court’s use of custom when interpreting the 
AUMF is explained.  The use of custom as a source of law in Al-Bihani is then 
evaluated in light of the Supreme Court case law on custom and the critiques 
of that case law.  This section then considers the persuasive influence of Al-
Bihani and the ways in which the court’s findings have been limited by the 
executive branch.  Next, Part II describes the arguments of those asserting 
custom as a source of legal authority for targeted killings in testimony before 
Congress, and evaluates these arguments in light of the Supreme Court 
precedent on custom.  Lastly, it is argued that Congress should speak clearly 
on national security matters in the war on terrorism, particularly as it applies to 
detention and targeted killings.  Such congressional action would preclude any 
arguments that Congress has acquiesced in these executive practices. 
I.  SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT: RELYING ON CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW 
The Supreme Court has relied on custom, or “non-judicial precedent,” on a 
number of occasions.16  The cases discussed in this background section are 
those that were relied on the D.C. Circuit in denying the rehearing of Al-Bihani 
and by other commentators, who have invoked custom as a source of legal 
 
 14. See Scott Shane, Mark Mazzetti & Robert F. Worth, A Secret Assault on Terror Widens 
on Two Continents, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2010, at A1 (discussing the use of targeted killings in 
Pakistan and Yemen). 
 15. See infra Part I; see also BEDERMAN, supra note 4, at 110–111 (finding that “proof of a 
binding constitutional custom is premised on two broad components. The first element is the 
objective extent, duration, and consistency of the practice” and a “subjective element” which “in 
U.S. constitutional law boils down to whether the opposing branch in the separation-of-powers-
struggle has actually accepted or ‘acquiesced’ in the practice”). 
 16. See Gerhardt, supra note 2, at 749–54; Glennon, supra note 4, at 115–16. 
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authority.17  This precedent provides standards that should be applied when 
using custom as a source of law and places these standards within the factual 
context in which they arose. 
A. Stuart v. Laird: Early Origins 
In 1803, the Supreme Court relied on custom to uphold the power of the 
Supreme Court Justices to sit as circuit judges.18  It was objected that “the 
judges of the supreme court ha[d] no right to sit as circuit judges, not being 
appointed as such,” and that “they ought to have distinct commissions for that 
purpose.”19  In response, the Court stated that the practice of justices sitting as 
circuit judges dated back to the beginning of the federal judiciary.20  The Court 
further stated: 
[T]hat practice and acquiescence under it for a period of several years, 
commencing with the organization of the judicial system, affords an irresistible 
answer, and had indeed fixed the construction.  It is a contemporary 
interpretation of the most forcible nature.  This practical [instruction] is too 
strong and obstinate to be shaken or controlled.21 
B. Midwest Oil: Modern Origins 
United States v. Midwest Oil Co. concerned an 1897 congressional statute 
that allowed all public lands containing petroleum or oil to be “free and open 
to occupation, exploration and purchase by citizens of the United States.”22  
Because the statute permitted exploration without fees and title could be 
obtained for nominal amounts, “many persons availed themselves of the 
provisions of the statute.”23  As a result, large areas of California were 
explored, petroleum was found, and landowners began to rapidly extract oil 
from the land.24  The rapid decrease in oil prompted the Department of Interior 
to issue a report on September 17, 1909, which indicated that the United States 
should suspend the filing of claims to oil lands, otherwise the “Government 
will be obliged to repurchase the very oil that it has practically given away.”25 
 
 17. See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra 
note 3, at 848–54. 
 18. Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 300–09 (1803). 
 19. Id. at 309. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. 236 U.S. 459, 466 (1915) (citation omitted). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 466–67.  In more detail, the report indicated the petroleum would be needed for the 
U.S. Navy: 
[A]t the rate at which oil lands in California were being patented by private parties it 
would be impossible for the people of the United States to continue ownership of oil lands 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] AL-BIHANI V. OBAMA & CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 585 
President Taft issued a proclamation ten days after this report that 
temporarily withdrew over three million acres of land in California and 
Wyoming from oil development.26  Six months after this proclamation, the 
Midwest Oil Company and others bored wells and allegedly extracted 50,000 
barrels of oil from public land in Wyoming that had been set aside by the 
President.27  The government sought to recover the land and money for the oil 
already extracted.28 
The Court found that the case could be determined in “light of the legal 
consequences flowing from a long continued practice to make orders like the 
one” President Taft made in 1910.29  The Court first referenced past examples 
“in which the Executive, by a special order, has withdrawn land which 
Congress, by general statute, had thrown open to acquisition by citizens.”30  
Specifically, the Court referenced executive orders that established or enlarged 
Indian reservations, military reservations, and bird reserves.31  Moreover, the 
Court found “Congress did not repudiate the [executive] power claimed or the 
withdrawal orders made.  On the contrary it uniformly and repeatedly 
acquiesced in the practice and as shown by these records, there had been, prior 
to 1910, at least 252 Executive Orders making reservations for useful, though 
non-statutory purposes.”32 
The Court further found that in 1902, Congress was put on notice of the 
executive’s power to withdrawal land and that the executive had exercised that 
power.33  The Court reasoned Congress had never “repudiate[d] the action 
taken or the power claimed.  Its silence was acquiescence.  Its acquiescence 
was equivalent to consent to continue the practice until the power was revoked 
by some subsequent action by Congress.”34  The Court also looked to prior 
 
for more than a few months. After that the Government will be obliged to repurchase the 
very oil that it has practically given away.  In view of the increasing use of fuel by the 
American Navy there would appear to be an immediate necessity for assuring the 
conservation of a proper supply of petroleum for the Government’s own use and pending 
the enactment of adequate legislation on this subject, the filing of claims to oil lands in the 
State of California should be suspended. 
Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 26. Id. at 467. 
 27. Id. at 467–68. 
 28. Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 468. 
 29. Id. at 469 (emphasis added). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 470. 
 32. Id. at 471. 
 33. Id. at 480–81. 
 34. Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 481.  To counter the argument that executive practice might 
“prove a usage” but did “not establish its validity,” the Court found that “in determining the 
meaning of a statute or the existence of a power, weight shall be given to the usage itself—even 
when the validity of the practice is the subject of investigation.”  Id. at 472–73.  To support this 
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Supreme Court precedent and found that these cases “clearly indicate that the 
long-continued practice [of the executive], known to and acquiesced in by 
Congress, would raise a presumption . . . of its consent.”35  In sum, the Court 
found “the long-continued practice, the acquiescence of Congress, as well as 
the decisions of the courts, all show that the President had the power to make 
the [withdrawal] order.”36 
C. Youngstown: A Framework for Using Custom as a Source of Law 
The Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer decision, which concerned 
President Truman’s seizure of the nation’s steel mills in 1952, resulted in 
numerous concurring opinions.37  These concurrences established a framework 
for using history and custom as a source of authority when interpreting the 
Constitution and statutes.38  The majority opinion rejected the use of historical 
precedent,39 but it is the concurring opinions that have been most repeatedly 
quoted in subsequent cases in which the use of custom as a source of legal 
authority was validated. 
In 1951, a dispute arose between steel companies and their employees over 
terms and conditions for collective bargaining agreements.40  The dispute could 
not be settled, and the worker’s union gave notice of a nation-wide strike to 
begin on April 9, 1952.41  The President believed the strike would 
“immediately jeopardize [the nation’s] national defense” since steel was an 
indispensable component of substantially all weapons and other war 
materials.42  Hours before the strike began, the President issued an order 
directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of most of the nation’s 
steel mills and keep them running.43  On April 30, the district court issued an 
injunction restraining the Secretary from continuing the seizure, and the court 
of appeals stayed the district court’s injunction that same day.44  On June 2, 
 
conclusion, the Court stated that “law-makers and citizens naturally adjust themselves to any 
long-continued action of the Executive Department—on the presumption that unauthorized acts 
would not have allowed to be so often repeated as to crystallize into a regular practice.”  Id. 
 35. Id. at 474; see, e.g., Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803); Fairbank v. 
United States, 181 U.S. 283, 306 (1901). 
 36. Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 483. 
 37. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 38. See id. at 635–38 (Jackson, J., concurring) (setting forth a three part framework for 
evaluating legality of executive action depending on whether it is 1) supported by congressional 
authorization; 2) done in the face of congressional ambiguity; or 3) contrary to congressional 
will). 
 39. See infra notes 49–51 and accompanying text. 
 40. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582. 
 41. Id. at 583. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 584. 
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less than two months after the initial order, the Supreme Court handed down its 
opinion.45 
Justice Black’s majority opinion found that no statute authorized the 
seizure.46  Thus, if the President had authority to issue the order, “it must be 
found in some provision of the Constitution.”47  He rejected arguments that 
reasoned the order could be sustained as the exercise of the President’s military 
power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.48  In addition, the order 
could not be sustained under the President’s power to see that the laws are 
faithfully executed since “[t]he President’s order does not direct that a 
congressional policy be executed in a manner prescribed by Congress—it 
directs that a presidential policy be executed in a manner prescribed by the 
President.”49  In this regard, Justice Black explicitly rejected arguments from 
historical precedent that “other Presidents without congressional authority have 
taken possession of private business enterprises in order to settle labor 
disputes.”50  “[E]ven if this be true,” Justice Black wrote, “Congress has not 
thereby lost its exclusive constitutional authority to make laws necessary and 
proper to carry out the powers vested by the Constitution.”51 
It is evident that Justice Black’s approach primarily looks at the text of the 
Constitution.52  In contrast, the opinions of Justice Frankfurter and Justice 
Jackson claim to give the Constitution a “scope and elasticity . . . instead of the 
rigidity dictated by a doctrinaire textualism.”53  In this regard, Justice 
Frankfurter found that the content for understanding the separation of powers 
built into the Constitution “is not to be derived from an abstract analysis.”54  
Rather, “[t]he Constitution is a framework for government,” and “the way the 
framework has consistently operated fairly establishes that it has operated 
according to its true nature.”55  Thus: 
Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government cannot supplant 
the Constitution or legislation, but they give meaning to the words of a text or 
supply them.  It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American 
constitutional law to confine it to the words of the Constitution and to 
disregard the gloss which life has written upon them.  In short, a systematic, 
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress 
 
 45. Id. at 583–84. 
 46. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582, 585–86. 
 47. Id. at 587. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 587–88. 
 50. Id. at 588. 
 51. Id. at 588–89. 
 52. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587–88. 
 53. Id. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 54. Id. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 55. Id. 
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and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents . . . may be treated as a 
gloss on “executive Power” vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.56 
Justice Frankfurter found support for his conclusions from Midwest Oil.57  
For him, Midwest Oil helped “draw a clear line between authority not 
explicitly conferred yet authorized to be exercised by the President and the 
denial of such authority.”58  In contrast with Midwest Oil, where the Court 
found Presidents over a period of eighty years and in 252 instances had 
temporarily withdrawn land already entered for public use in order to enable 
Congress to deal with such withdrawals, “[n]o remotely comparable practice 
can be vouched for executive seizure of property at a time when this country 
was not at war.”59 
Similar to Justice Frankfurter, Justice Jackson found “[t]he actual art of 
governing under our Constitution does not and cannot conform to judicial 
definitions of the power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or 
even single Articles torn from context.”60  Thus, “[w]hile the Constitution 
diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice 
will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government.”61  In this 
regard, Justice Jackson identified “a somewhat over-simplified grouping of 
practical situations in which a President may doubt, or others may challenge, 
his powers.”62 
First, “[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or implied 
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum.”63  Thus, “[a] 
seizure executed by the President pursuant to an Act of Congress would be 
supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial 
interpretation.”64  In contrast, when the President takes measures incompatible 
with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its “lowest 
ebb.”65  Thus, “[c]ourts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a 
case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.”66  Justice 
Jackson found that President Truman’s seizure fell within this category, and, 
 
 56. Id. at 610–11 (emphasis added). 
 57. Id. at 611. 
 58. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 611. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 61. Id. at 635. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 637–38. 
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thus, concurred in Justice Black’s judgment.67  In between these two areas is a 
“zone of twilight”: 
  When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or 
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but 
there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent 
authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional 
inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical 
matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential 
responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the 
imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract 
theories of law.68 
D. Agee and Dames & Moore: Applying Custom as a Source of Law in the 
National Security Context 
1. Haig v. Agee 
Philip Agee was an ex-CIA agent who, in 1974, announced a campaign to 
“fight the United States CIA wherever it [was] operating.”69  To accomplish 
his goal, Agee “repeatedly and publicly identified individuals and 
organizations located in foreign countries as undercover CIA agents, 
employees, or sources.”70  The Court found Agee’s campaign violated his 
contract with the CIA, prejudiced the ability of the United States to obtain 
intelligence, and resulted in episodes of violence against the persons 
identified.71  In 1979, the Secretary of State revoked Agee’s passport pursuant 
to a federal regulation and sent Agee a revocation notice, which made him 
aware of his right to an administrative hearing.72  The notice offered to hold a 
hearing in West Germany in five days, but Agee declined this offer and instead 
contested the revocation of his passport in federal court.73 
The district court held the regulation exceeded the statutory powers of the 
Secretary under the Passport Act of 1926 and ordered the Secretary to restore 
his passport.74  A divided panel of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, 
holding “the Secretary was required to show that Congress had authorized the 
 
 67. Id. at 640; see also Laurence H. Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the 
Sounds of Congressional and Constitutional Silence, 57 IND. L.J. 515, 520 (1982) (finding that “a 
decisive majority of five Justices treated Congress’ silence as speech—its nonenactment of 
authorizing legislation as a legally binding expression of intent to forbid the seizure at issue”). 
 68. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (emphasis added). 
 69. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 283 (1981). 
 70. Id. at 284. 
 71. Id. at 284–85. 
 72. Id. at 286–87. 
 73. Id. at 287. 
 74. Id. at 287–88. 
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regulation either by an express delegation or by implied approval of a 
‘substantial and consistent’ administrative practice.”75  The appeals court did 
not find there to be a substantial practice since they could find only one 
passport revocation since 1926 and only five before that, which were 
“arguably” denied for national security or foreign policy reasons.76 
The Supreme Court began by interpreting the 1926 Passport Act.77  The 
Court found this Act granted broad rule-making powers to the executive 
because the Act concerned the areas of “foreign policy and national security, 
where congressional silence is not to be equated with congressional 
disapproval.”78  Thus, “a consistent administrative construction of [the 1926 
Act] must be followed by the courts ‘unless there are compelling indications 
that it is wrong.’”79  The Court further noted that Congress is not required to 
give specific direction to the executive in the area of foreign affairs: 
[B]ecause of the changeable and explosive nature of contemporary 
international relations, and the fact that the Executive is immediately privy to 
information which cannot be swiftly presented to, evaluated by, and acted 
upon by the legislature, Congress—in giving the Executive authority over 
matters of foreign affairs—must of necessity paint with a brush broader than 
that it customarily wields in domestic areas.80 
The Court considered the history of passport control in the United States.81  
First, the Court found congressional recognition of executive authority to 
withhold passports on the basis of substantial reasons of national security and 
foreign policy was shown from the “earliest days of the Republic.”82  Also, 
“[t]he President and the Secretary of State consistently construed the first 
[passport legislation] to preserve their authority to withhold passports on 
national security and foreign policy grounds.”83  The Court next concluded 
“Congress, in 1926, adopted the longstanding administrative construction of 
the 1856 statute,” and the “Executive construed the 1926 Act to work no 
change in prior practice and specifically interpreted it to authorize denial of a 
 
 75. Haig, 453 U.S. at 288 (emphasis added) (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 12 (1965)). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 290. 
 78. Id. at 291. 
 79. Id. at 291 (quoting E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 55 (1977)). 
 80. Id. at 292 (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 17 (1965)).  It is also important to note 
that the Court quickly dismissed Agee’s argument that “Executive policy [was] entitled to 
diminished weight because many of them concern the powers of the Executive in wartime.”  Id. at 
303.  The Court responded by finding that “the statute provides no support for this argument” and 
that “[h]istory eloquently attests that grave problems of national security and foreign policy are 
by no means limited to times of formally declared war.”  Id. 
 81. Haig, 453 U.S. at 292–301. 
 82. Id. at 293. 
 83. Id. at 295. 
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passport on grounds of national security or foreign policy.”84  The Court 
further stated, 
Indeed, by an unbroken line of Executive Orders, regulations, instructions to 
consular officials, and notices to passport holders, the President and the 
Department of State left no doubt that likelihood of damage to national 
security or foreign policy of the United States was the single most important 
criterion in passport decisions.85 
Thus, the Court held the regulations Agee had challenged were “‘sufficiently 
substantial and consistent’ to compel the conclusion that Congress had 
approved it.”86 
2. Dames & Moore 
Dames & Moore v. Regan, decided a week after Haig v. Agee, concerned 
events surrounding the November 4, 1979, capture and hostage of U.S. 
diplomatic personnel in Tehran, Iran.87  In response to this crisis, President 
Carter declared a national emergency under the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), froze all Iranian assets in the United States, 
prohibited prejudgment attachment on those assets unless licensed by the 
Treasury Department, and prevented entry of any final judgment affecting the 
frozen Iranian assets.88 
In December of 1979, Dames & Moore, an American company, filed suit 
against the Government of Iran, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran 
(AEOI), and a number of Iranian banks.89  Dames & Moore had contracted 
with the AEOI to “conduct site studies for a proposed nuclear power plant in 
Iran.”90  As provided by the contract, AEOI terminated the agreement, and 
Dames & Moore sued seeking nearly $3.5 million for services performed prior 
to contract termination.91 
 
 84. Id. at 297–98. 
 85. Id. at 298 (footnotes omitted).  While indicating “congressional acquiescence may 
sometimes be found from nothing more than silence in the face of an administrative policy,” the 
Court found that the inference of congressional approval “is supported by more than mere 
congressional inaction.”  Id. at 300 (quoting Zemel, 381 U.S. at 11–12).  Specifically, the Court 
pointed to amendments made in 1978 to the Passport Act, which made it unlawful to travel 
abroad without a passport even in peacetime.  Id. at 300 n.48.  Thus, “[d]espite the longstanding 
and officially promulgated view that the Executive had the power to withhold passports for 
reasons of national security and foreign policy, Congress in 1978, though it once again enacted 
legislation relating to passports, left completely untouched the broad rule-making authority 
granted in the earlier Act.”  Id. at 301 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 86. Id. at 306 (quoting Zemel, 381 U.S. at 12). 
 87. 453 U.S. 654, 662 (1981). 
 88. Id. at 662–63. 
 89. Id. at 663–64. 
 90. Id. at 664. 
 91. Id. 
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In January of 1981, President Carter negotiated an agreement by which all 
Government and private claims with Iran would be terminated or arbitrated by 
an Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in exchange for the release of the 
American hostages.92  President Carter then issued executive orders to 
implement this agreement, which revoked all previous judgments regarding 
Iranian funds, securities, or deposits, nullified all non-Iranian interests in these 
assets, and required banks holding Iranian assets to transfer them to a federal 
reserve bank.93  In February, President Reagan “ratified” these orders and 
suspended all claims in U.S. federal courts in favor of the Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal.94  In response, Dames & Moore filed suit against the 
Secretary of the Treasury to prevent enforcement of the executive orders and 
argued the President went beyond his statutory and constitutional powers in 
making the agreement with Iran.95 
The Court found explicit congressional authorization in the IEEPA for the 
President’s ability to freeze Iranian assets.96  However, the Court had more 
difficulties with the President’s authority to suspend claims pending in 
American courts.97  The Court specifically rejected the notion that the 
President had the right to act with inherent power in the area of international 
relations; however, the Court did find that the “failure of Congress specifically 
to delegate authority does not, ‘especially. . . in the areas of foreign policy and 
national security,’ imply ‘congressional disapproval’ of action taken by the 
Executive.”98  Thus, the Court effectively found the President’s suspension of 
private claims fell into Justice Jackson’s “twilight zone,” where Congress has 
neither explicitly approved nor disapproved of executive action.99 
The Court then explored the history of congressional acquiescence in the 
practice of claim settlement by executive agreement.100  The Court found that 
since 1799, the executive branch had exercised the power to settle claims, and 
from 1817 to 1917, at least eighty executive agreements were entered into by 
the United States.101  The Court also cited ten binding settlements with foreign 
nations since 1952 in concluding “that the practice of settling claims continues 
today.”102  Also, crucial to the Court’s decision was the “conclusion that 
Congress [had] implicitly approved the practice of claim settlement by 
 
 92. Id. at 664–65. 
 93. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 665–66. 
 94. Id. at 666. 
 95. Id. at 666–67. 
 96. Id. at 669–74. 
 97. Id. at 675. 
 98. Id. at 678 (emphasis added) (citing Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291 (1981)). 
 99. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678. 
 100. Id. at 678–79. 
 101. Id. at 679 n.8. 
 102. Id. at 680 & n.9. 
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executive agreement.”103  For example, Congress enacted the International 
Claims Settlement Act of 1949 (ICSA), and “[o]ver the years Congress has 
frequently amended the [ICSA] to provide for particular problems arising out 
of settlement agreements, thus demonstrating Congress’ continuing acceptance 
of the President’s claim settlement authority.”104  The Court further noted that 
in 1972, Congress had entertained legislation relating to congressional 
oversight of claim settlements by executive agreement.105  However, Congress 
left the area “untouched” and thus it “failed to object to this longstanding 
practice . . . even when it has had an opportunity to do so.”106  Relying on 
Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in Youngstown and the Midwest Oil 
precedent, the Court concluded that “[p]ast practice does not, by itself, create 
power, but ‘long-continued practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress, 
would raise a presumption that the [action] had been [taken] in pursuance of its 
consent.’”107 
E. Hamdi: Not an Example of Custom as a Source of Law 
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court considered events stemming from the 
September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States by the al Qaeda 
network.108  After this attack, Congress issued the AUMF, and soon thereafter 
the President ordered U.S. Armed Forces to Afghanistan with a mission to 
subdue al Qaeda.109  In 2001, as part of that mission, the United States captured 
and detained Yaser Esam Hamdi, a U.S. citizen.110  Hamdi was originally 
detained in Afghanistan and then was brought to the United States, at which 
time his father challenged the detention.111 
The plurality opinion first considered as a threshold matter whether the 
United States had the authority to detain Hamdi.112  In making this 
determination, the Court first looked at the text of the AUMF, which 
 
 103. Id. at 680. 
 104. Id. at 681. 
 105. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 682 n.10. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 686 (quoting United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915)).  The 
use of executive branch practice as described in Youngstown and Dames & Moore has also been 
invoked more recently by the Supreme Court.  See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 
420 (2003).  In this case, the Court stated that cases have recognized that the President has 
authority to make “‘executive agreements’ with other countries, requiring no ratification by the 
Senate or approval by Congress, this power having been exercised since the early years of the 
Republic,” and “the practice goes back over 200 years, and has received congressional 
acquiescence throughout its history.”  Id. at 415 (citing Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 682–83). 
 108. 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 510–11. 
 112. Id. at 516. 
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authorized the President “to use ‘all necessary and appropriate force’ against 
‘nations, organizations, or persons’ associated with the September 11, 2001, 
terrorist attacks.”113  “There can be no doubt,” the Court found, “that 
individuals who fought against the United States in Afghanistan as part of the 
Taliban, an organization known to have supported the al Qaeda terrorist 
network responsible for those attacks, are individuals Congress sought to target 
in passing the AUMF.”114  The Court concluded that detention of enemy 
combatants was “so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an 
exercise of the ‘necessary and appropriate force’ Congress has authorized the 
President to use.”115  In this regard, the Court found the capture, detention, and 
trial of combatants by “universal agreement and practice” are “important 
incident[s] of war.”116 
In Hamdi, the Supreme Court considered the fact that a President had 
conducted detentions in the past.117  However, the Hamdi Court did not 
consider whether there was an executive practice in which Congress 
acquiesced.  Hamdi is discussed in this section since it is relied on by the court 
in Al-Bihani to support the conclusion that courts should look to custom as a 
source of authority when interpreting the AUMF.  Hamdi, however, should not 
be categorized as Supreme Court precedent that provides standards for using 
custom as a source of law, which is summarized and critiqued in the next 
section. 
II.  EVALUATING CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW IN THE WAR ON TERROR 
A. Summary & Critique of Supreme Court’s Reliance on Custom as a Source 
of Law 
1. Summary & Critique 
The Court in Midwest Oil found that “the long-continued practice [of the 
executive], known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a 
presumption . . . of its consent.”118  Similarly, Justice Frankfurter’s 
 
 113. Id. at 518 (quoting Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 
Stat. 224 (2001)). 
 114. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942)).  The Court also found that there was 
no bar to the U.S. holding one of its own citizens as an enemy combatant.  Id. at 519.  For this 
part of its holding, the Court looked to Supreme Court precedent in Ex parte Quirin, which held 
that citizens could be considered belligerents within the meaning of the law of war.  Id. (citing Ex 
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 20, 37–38).  The Court also referenced the Lieber Code and its 
regulations concerning the Union’s detention of “captured rebels” as prisoners of war.  Id. 
 117. Id. at 516–517. 
 118. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915). 
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concurrence in Youngstown found that a “systematic, unbroken, executive 
practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before 
questioned, engaged in by Presidents . . . may be treated as a gloss on 
‘executive Power’ vested in the President.”119  These cases were relied on by 
the Court in Haig v. Agee and Dames & Moore and suggest two major 
requirements when using custom as a source of legal authority.120  First, there 
must be a practice that is long-continued, systematic, and unbroken.  Second, 
there must be knowing acquiescence by Congress in such a practice.121  
However, determining whether these two elements exist is a malleable process 
subject to criticism. 
a. A Long-Continued, Systematic, and Unbroken Practice 
In Midwest Oil, the Court indicated that the executive practice of land 
withdrawal occurred 252 times and occurred over an eighty-year period.122  By 
contrast, in Youngstown there were only three instances of comparable 
executive factory seizures, which were not deemed controlling because they 
occurred within a six-month period.123  In Haig v. Agee, the lower court noted 
that only one passport had been revoked on national security grounds since 
1926.124  However, the Supreme Court traced a long history from “the earliest 
days of the Republic” in finding an “unbroken line” of executive action in 
withholding passports on national security and foreign policy grounds.125  In 
Dames & Moore, the Court found that the executive branch had exercised the 
power to settle claims since 1799, and further referenced ten binding 
 
 119. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
 120. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 293–97 (1981); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 
654, 668 (1981). 
 121. Scholars have suggested other requirements when determining whether a custom has 
legal authority.  For example, Glennon indicates several factors that a court should consider when 
determining whether a custom exist: 1) consistency; 2) numerosity; 3) duration; 4) density; 5) 
continuity; and 6) normalcy.  Glennon, supra note 4, at 128–133.  However, consistency is the 
only one that “must be present to justify the conclusion that a custom exists.”  Id. at 133.  He 
further argues that U.S. customary law should be predicated on opinio juris which assumes the 
concurrence of three elements: first, the custom in question must consist of acts and not just mere 
assertions of authority to act; second, the coordinate branch must have been on notice of the acts 
occurrence; and third, the branch placed on notice must have acquiesced in the custom.  Id. at 
134; see also Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 3, at 853 (suggesting that there is a “typically 
unstated but universally assumed predicate of customary law: the executive practice must not 
violate any constitutional provision or statute” (footnotes omitted)). 
 122. 236 U.S. at 469, 471. 
 123. 343 U.S. at 613 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 124. 453 U.S. at 288. 
 125. Id. at 293, 298. 
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settlements with foreign nations since 1952 in concluding that the practice of 
claims settlement was long-continued.126 
These cases reveal that the criteria for determining when a practice is long-
continued and unbroken are not well-settled and are based on the 
circumstances of each case.  Is it based on the number of times the executive 
has performed the practice, or is it dependent on the duration of a practice over 
a long period of time?  Does it matter at what point in history the practice 
originated—from “the earliest days of the Republic”127—or is a later date 
sufficient?  Moreover, justification for a practice can be found on how the 
Court chooses to define the problem.  This was evident in Haig v. Agee, where 
the Supreme Court pointed to a long history of withholding passports on 
national security grounds in refuting the lower courts determination that there 
was not a substantial and consistent practice of revoking passports on national 
security grounds.128 
b. Knowing Acquiescence by Congress in an Executive Practice 
In Midwest Oil, the Court pointed to legislation in 1902, which put 
Congress on notice of the executive’s power to withdraw land, thereby 
indicating that Congress had subsequently acquiesced in the power by the 
President to withdraw land.129  In Haig v. Agee, the Court indicated the 
executive “history of administrative construction was repeatedly 
communicated to Congress, not only by routine promulgation of Executive 
Orders and regulations, but also by specific presentations” to the Senate.130  
The Court found “silence in the face of an administrative policy” is enough to 
recognize congressional acquiescence; however, a conclusion based on silence 
was unnecessary because Congress impliedly authorized the passport statute 
when a 1978 amendment “left completely untouched the broad rule-making 
authority granted in the [1926] Act.”131  Similarly, the Dames & Moore Court 
found Congress had impliedly authorized settlements, because it had 
repeatedly amended the International Claims Settlement Act and because 
Congress had “failed to object to [the] longstanding practice” when it 
entertained legislation relating to congressional oversight of claim settlements 
 
 126. 453 U.S. 654, 679–80 & n.9 (1981). 
 127. Haig, 453 U.S. at 293. 
 128. Id. at 287–88, 297–98; see also, Jason T. Burnette, Note, Eyes on Their Own Paper: 
Practical Construction in Constitutional Interpretation, 39 GA. L. REV. 1096–97 (finding that 
“[b]y merely refocusing the lens of historical inquiry—broadening or narrowing the level of 
generality, or creating ad hoc categories to distinguish inconsistent facts—lawyers and judges 
may invoke a tradition to support ‘almost any cause’” (footnote omitted)). 
 129. 236 U.S. 459, 481 (1915). 
 130. 453 U.S. at 299. 
 131. Id. at 300–01 (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1965)). 
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by executive agreement.132  Determining whether Congress has acquiesced in 
an executive practice is subject to several criticisms. 
First, using custom as legal authority “places improper weight on the 
inaction of subsequent Congresses in interpreting the meaning of prior 
legislation they had no part in enacting.”133  Placing weight on the inaction of 
subsequent Congresses is “inconsistent with the traditional proposition that the 
legislative ‘intent’ relevant to statutory interpretation is the intent of the 
enacting Congress, not the continuing intent of subsequent Congresses.”134  
Thus, “[i]f subsequent legislative statements directly supporting a statutory 
interpretation are not valid evidence, how can subsequent legislative silence, 
usually just indirectly supporting a statutory interpretation, be considered any 
more authoritative?”135 
Second, determining congressional notice and acquiescence is a malleable 
process, subject to the ways in which a court reads the legislative history 
indicating congressional notice and acquiescence.136  For example, the Dames 
& Moore Court was selective in both the original legislative history of the 
statute and subsequent legislative silence: 
[The Court] read IEEPA’s language as unambiguously authorizing some of the 
executive acts under challenge, thereby ignoring the legislative history of the 
statute, which . . .  clearly evinced the contrary legislative intent to narrow 
presidential power.  [Also], rather than construe IEEPA’s silence regarding the 
suspension of claims as preempting the president’s claim of inherent power to 
act, [the Court] construed a history of unchecked executive practice, the fact of 
IEEPA’s existence, and the absence of express congressional disapproval of 
the president’s action to demonstrate that Congress had impliedly authorized 
the act, thereby elevating the president’s power from the twilight zone—
Jackson’s category two—to its height in Jackson’s category one.137 
 
 132. 453 U.S. at 681–82 & n.10. 
 133. Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 3, at 853–54. 
 134. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 95 
(1988). 
 135. Id. at 96. 
 136. Id.  Eskridge further notes that: 
  Even contemporaneous legislative history may be unreliable and subject to 
manipulation.  As legislators and lobbyists have begun to understand how much courts 
use legislative history, posturing and fabrication have become possible.  The fight, if lost 
on the language of the statute, moves to the language of the committee report or perhaps 
to getting a scripted colloquy entered into the Congressional Record.  The hope is that an 
unfavorable but likely interpretation will be limited, if not excluded, by the extra-statutory 
information. 
Id. at 95 n.164. 
 137. KOH, supra note 3, at 139.  The determination of acquiescence can also be determined 
by defining what the legislature acquiesces in.  For example, the Dames & Moore Court could 
have struck down the agreement in question by noting the lack of congressional acquiescence 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
598 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXI:579 
A third problem is the difficulty of making inferences “for a large 
collection of people, especially when their decisionmaking is as structured as 
that in Congress.”138  As has been pointed out, “the structure of Congress 
makes it far more likely that something will not happen (inaction) than that it 
will (action).”139  Since “[n]ational security disputes often ‘will not involve 
clear congressional affirmations and will thus require a determination of 
whether consent can be inferred from silence or no action,’” they are especially 
susceptible to this criticism.140  Such inferences were evident in both Haig and 
Dames & Moore, which found implied authorizations for executive action 
based on subsequent legislation.141 
2. National Security Customary Law 
The Supreme Court precedent on custom also indicates the Court’s 
approval of broad, legislative delegations of power to the President in the area 
 
surrounding the general practice of using executive agreements.  Glennon, supra note 4, at 129–
30.  However, “[b]y particularizing the practice to executive claims settlement agreements, . . . 
the Court defined a custom consisting of a handful of specific agreements about which little 
controversy had occurred, thus ensuring that the custom was supported by self-selected 
precedents.”  Id. at 130. 
 138. Eskridge, supra note 134, at 98.  As Justice Scalia has also noted, legislative inaction 
may signify “(1) approval of the status quo, as opposed to (2) inability to agree upon how to alter 
the status quo, (3) unawareness of the status quo, (4) indifference to the status quo, or even (5) 
political cowardice.”  Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 672 (1987) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 139. Eskridge, supra note 134, at 98.  To make his point, Eskridge explains the legislative 
process: 
The legislative agenda is severely limited; to gain a place on that agenda, a measure must 
not only have substantial support, but be considered urgent by key people (such as the 
President and/or the party leadership in Congress).  Even if a proposal finds a place on the 
legislative agenda, it is usually doomed if there is substantial opposition, whether or not 
most legislators favor it, because of the variety of procedural roadblocks opponents may 
erect.  A bill can effectively be killed by a hostile committee or subcommittee chair in 
either chamber, by a hostile House or Senate leadership, by a hostile Rules Committee in 
the House or by a filibuster in the Senate. Consequently, even if a majority of the 
members of Congress disagree with a judicial or administrative interpretation of a statute, 
it is very unlikely that they will be able to amend the statute quickly, if at all. 
Id. at 99 (footnotes omitted). 
 140. Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 3, at 853 (footnote omitted). 
 141. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 297–99 (1981); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 
654, 681–82 (1981).  There is also a formal problem with relying on legislative acquiescence as 
implied Congressional approval.  Typically before a legislative enactment is given authority, it 
must be passed by both chambers of Congress and presented to the President.  Eskridge, supra 
note 134, at 96 (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)).  Thus, cases relying on implied 
Congressional authorization from silence or rejected proposals (as was the case in Haig and 
Dames & Moore) would not seem to have legislative effect since they did not follow the specific 
constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment.  See id. at 96. 
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of national security and foreign affairs.  For example, the Court in Haig stated, 
“Congress—in giving the Executive authority over matters of foreign affairs—
must of necessity paint with a brush broader than that it customarily wields in 
domestic areas.”142  The Court indicated the reason for such a broad delegation 
was the “changeable and explosive nature of contemporary international 
relations, and the fact that the Executive is immediately privy to information 
which cannot be swiftly presented to, evaluated by, and acted upon by the 
legislature.”143  The Dames & Moore Court further confirmed this sentiment: 
“Congress cannot anticipate and legislate with regard to every possible action 
the President may find it necessary to take or every possible situation in which 
he might act.”144  These statements indicate the Supreme Court’s deferential 
attitude toward presidential action in the area of national security and foreign 
affairs.  Thus, some scholars have concluded that when the President “acts 
with sufficient consistency over time and Congress knowingly acquiesces, this 
interaction may create customary national security law.  The custom evidences 
the political branches’ joint interpretation of the President’s constitutional or 
statutory authority.”145 
Koh offers less generous reasons than the Supreme Court to explain 
congressional deference to the executive.  Koh found that Congress has 
persistently acquiesced in executive efforts because of “legislative myopia, 
inadequate drafting, ineffective legislative tools, and an institutional lack of 
political will.”146  One example of legislative myopia that Koh indicated is the 
War Powers Resolution of 1973, which was “drafted principally to halt 
 
 142. 453 U.S. at 292 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965)). 
 143. Id. (quoting Zemel, 381 U.S. at 17). 
 144. 453 U.S. at 678.  Some have thus concluded, concerning Haig and Dames & Moore, that 
“[t]aken together, the message to Congress seems plain: Absent clear congressional disapproval, 
the Supreme Court will not interfere with executive decisions when they concern foreign affairs.”  
William P. Hovell et al., Separation of Powers—Congressional Acquiescence and Executive 
Discretion in Foreign Affairs, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 868, 881 (1982).  It has also been argued 
that “Congress is poorly structured for initiative and leadership . . . .  The presidency, in contrast, 
is ideally structured for the receipt and exercise of power.”  KOH, supra note 3, at 118.  For Koh, 
however, this does not explain why the President chooses to wield the power.  The President does 
so because “[a]n entire generation of Americans grew up and came to power believing in the 
wisdom of the muscular presidential leadership of foreign policy,” and “a pervasive national 
perception that the presidency must act swiftly and secretly to respond to fast-moving 
international events has almost inevitably forced the executive branch into a continuing pattern of 
evasion of congressional restraint.”  Id. at 119, 122. 
 145. Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 3, at 849–50.  “Customary national security law” is 
not a term commonly referred to in the field of national security law, but some scholars do make 
use of it.  See, e.g., Margulies, supra note 13, at 5 (indicating that government lawyers may 
consider customary national security law as a source of legal authority when advising the 
President). 
 146. KOH, supra note 3, at 123. 
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creeping wars like Vietnam, not short-term military strikes or covert wars of 
the kind that dominate modern warfare.”147  Written in 1990, Koh’s words 
concerning legislative shortsightedness and the nature of covert warfare are 
pertinent when considering the Al-Bihani decision and a congressional 
response to the executive practice of targeted killing. 
B. Custom as a Source of Law: Al-Bihani v. Obama 
1. Al-Bihani I and II 
Petitioners who request an en banc hearing from the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia are generally denied, and these denials typically 
do not receive comment from the court.  Yet, the court’s en banc denial in Al-
Bihani v. Obama (Al-Bihani II) produced a short statement from seven of the 
judges and concurrences from each of the appellate panel judges who 
originally decided the case.148  To understand the unusual en banc denial and 
the framework for interpreting the September 2001 AUMF that the Al-Bihani 
justices propose, one must first look to the original opinion in Al-Bihani v. 
Obama (Al-Bihani I).149 
a. Al-Bihani I 
The panel considered the detention of Ghaleb Nassar Al-Bihani, a Yemeni 
citizen, who has been held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba since 2002.150  Al-Bihani 
accompanied the 55th Arab Brigade, a para-military group allied with the 
Taliban which included al Qaeda members within its command structure.151  
He worked as the brigade’s cook and carried a brigade-issued weapon that he 
claimed to have never fired.152  Al-Bihani did not dispute these facts; rather, he 
challenged the statutory legitimacy of his detention and argued U.S. reliance 
on his “support” of al Qaeda or the Taliban as a basis for his detention violated 
international law, and thus, the “standard should not be read into the 
ambiguous provisions of the [AUMF].”153 
 
 147. Id. at 123–24. 
 148. 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 149. 590 F.3d 866 (D. C. Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc denied, 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011). 
 150. Id. at 869.  Circuit Judge Janice Brown wrote the opinion, which was joined by Circuit 
Judge Brett Kavanaugh.  Id. at 868.  Judge Williams, a senior Circuit Judge, concurred in the 
judgment, but wrote a separate opinion because he disagreed with the majority’s analysis.  Id. at 
882 (Williams, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
 151. Id. at 869 (majority opinion). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 870–71.  Al-Bihani interpreted international law to require anyone not belonging to 
an official state military to be a civilian, and civilians, Al-Bihani argued, must directly participate 
in hostilities (e.g., fire a weapon in combat), before they can be lawfully detained.  Id. at 871.  
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The court found Al-Bihani’s arguments “rel[ied] heavily on the premise 
that the war powers granted by the AUMF and other statutes are limited by the 
international laws of war.”154  The court found this premise mistaken for two 
main reasons.  First, the court found no indication in the AUMF or any other 
congressional statute that Congress intended the international laws of war to 
act as extra-textual limiting principles for the President’s war powers under the 
AUMF.155  Furthermore, the majority wrote that, “[e]ven assuming Congress 
had at some earlier point implemented the laws of war as domestic law through 
appropriate legislation, Congress had the power to authorize the President in 
the AUMF and other later statutes to exceed those bounds.”156 
Second, the court found that “[f]urther weakening their relevance to this 
case, the international laws of war are not a fixed code.  Their dictates and 
application to actual events are by nature contestable and fluid.”157  “[T]here is 
‘no precise formula’ to identify a practice as [customary international law] 
and . . . ‘[i]t is often difficult to determine when [a custom’s] transformation 
into law has taken place.’”158  “Therefore, while the international laws of war 
are helpful to courts when identifying the general set of war powers to which 
the AUMF speaks, their lack of controlling legal force and firm definition 
render their use both inapposite and inadvisable when courts seek to determine 
the limits of the President’s war powers.”159  Accordingly, since the court did 
not find “vague treaty provisions and amorphous customary principles” as 
valid sources, they looked to “sources courts always look to” when resolving 
cases: “the text of relevant statutes and controlling domestic caselaw.”160 
What is not apparent in Al-Bihani I, but becomes apparent in Al-Bihani II, 
is that the court’s reliance on “statutes and controlling domestic caselaw” also 
included considering custom as a source of law. 
 
Because Al-Bihani did not fire a weapon or directly participate in hostilities, he contended that 
his detention was unlawful.  Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Al-Bihani I, 590 F.3d at 871. 
 156. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 115(1)(a) (1986)). 
 157. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 102 cmts. b & c). 
 158. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 102 cmts. b & c). 
 159. Id. (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004)). 
 160. Id. at 871–72.  The court subsequently assessed Al-Bihani’s detention under the AUMF, 
the Military Commission Acts of 2006 and 2009, and domestic cases in concluding that Al-
Bihani’s detention was lawful.  See id. at 872–75. 
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b. Al-Bihani II 
The Al-Bihani II opinion contained a short statement from the majority of 
judges that denied rehearing en banc and concurring opinions from each of the 
three judges who decided the case at the panel level, including a lengthy 
opinion from Judge Kavanaugh.161  Judge Kavanaugh’s concurring opinion in 
Al-Bihani II is an explanation, endorsed by Judge Brown, for the conclusions 
of the court in Al-Bihani I.162  In Al-Bihani II, Judge Kavanaugh explained his 
framework for interpreting the AUMF.  First, he noted “[i]nterpretation of a 
statute begins (and often ends) with its text.”163  In this regard, he found that 
the text of the AUMF was written in “broad terms” and “affords the President 
broad discretion with respect to methods of force, use of military resources, 
timing, and choice of targets—except, of course, to the extent the U.S. 
Constitution or other federal statutes or self-executing treaties independently 
limit the President.”164  But there was nothing in the text of the AUMF that 
indicated “Congress intended to impose judicially enforceable international-
law limits on the President’s war-making authority.”165 
Judge Kavanaugh further found Congress had enacted many statutes that 
expressly referred to international law, but unlike those statutes, the AUMF 
contained no reference to international law.166  He considered this omission 
“critically important” in light of the Supreme Court’s recognition that 
“Congress knows how to accord domestic effect to international obligations 
when it desires such a result.”167  Thus, this “silence strongly suggests that 
Congress did not intend to impose judicially enforceable international-law 
constraints on the President’s war-making authority.”168  “Rather,” Judge 
Kavanaugh wrote, “in ascertaining what the AUMF authorizes, courts presume 
that Congress authorized the President, except to the extent otherwise 
prohibited by the Constitution or statutes, to take at least those actions that 
U.S. Presidents historically have taken in wartime—including killing, 
 
 161. See 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 162. See id. at 9 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc). 
 163. Id. at 24. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 25. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Al-Bihani II, 619 F.3d at 25 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) 
(quoting Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 522 (2008)). 
 168. Id.  Judge Kavanaugh also addressed arguments that Congress’ use of the phrase “all 
necessary and appropriate force” signaled an implicit intent to bind the President to international 
law norms.  Id. at 25 n.11.  He found that the Necessary and Proper Clause in the Constitution has 
been viewed expansively and that Congress has used the phrase in other legislation to refer to 
broad grants of power, and thus this phrase is “more naturally read as emphasizing the breadth of 
the authorization.”  Id. at 25. 
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capturing, and detaining the enemy.”169  To support this proposition, he cited 
the Supreme Court cases of Dames & Moore, Haig v. Agee, and Midwest 
Oil.170  Judge Kavanaugh further noted that the plurality in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 
“‘looked to prior Executive Branch practice during wartime to inform its 
interpretation’ of the AUMF.”171  His framework thus moves from looking at 
the text of the congressional statute or authorization, recognizing any 
ambiguities or omissions in that text, to looking at the historical practices of 
the executive in which Congress has acquiesced. 
2. Evaluating the Use of Custom as a Source of Law: Al-Bihani 
Based on Supreme Court precedent, the framework of U.S. customary law 
requires (1) a long-continued practice and (2) knowing acquiescence in that 
practice.172  In Al-Bihani II, Judge Kavanaugh invoked the framework of 
relying on custom as part of Supreme Court precedent but did not employ this 
framework.  First, he did not conduct any historical analysis as to whether 
there was a long-continued practice of detention by U.S. presidents in wartime.  
He merely presumed that “killing, capturing, and detaining the enemy” is an 
action that U.S. Presidents historically have taken in wartime.173  While one 
would likely concede that “killing, capturing, and detaining” are generally 
accepted practices of Presidents in wartime, this statement begs further 
questions: Does the location of someone’s killing, capture, or detention affect 
the legality of the act?  Does the manner in which the person is captured or 
killed (e.g., a U.S. Predator drone strike) change the analysis or would a court 
simply analogize to ‘targeted killing’ attempts conducted during previous 
 
 169. Id. at 26 (emphasis added). 
 170. See id. 
 171. Id. at 42 (quoting Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization 
and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2085 (2005)).  It is evident throughout 
Judge Kavanaugh’s opinion that his reading of the AUMF draws from Bradley and Goldsmith’s 
law review article.  This article compares the AUMF to other authorizations to use force in U.S. 
history and proposes a framework for interpreting the AUMF: 
[T]he meaning of the AUMF is determined in the first instance by its text, as informed by 
a comparison with authorizations of force in prior wars, including declared wars.  In 
ascertaining the scope of the “necessary and appropriate force” that Congress authorized 
in the AUMF, courts should look to two additional interpretive factors: Executive Branch 
practice during prior wars, and the international laws of war. 
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra, at 2048 (emphasis added).  Judge Kavanaugh rejected using the 
international laws of war as an interpretive source for the AUMF and responded to Bradley and 
Goldsmith’s arguments in this regard.  See Al-Bihani II, 619 F.3d at 44 n.23 (Kavanaugh, J., 
concurring in denial of rehearing en banc). 
 172. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 173. See Al-Bihani II, 619 F.3d at 26 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en 
banc). 
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wars?174  Has indefinite detention been a part of executive historical practice?  
Thus, some careful analysis as to whether the executive has conducted similar 
practices to those conducted since 2001 would be warranted instead of 
presuming that killing, capturing, and detaining the enemy is always permitted. 
Moreover, Judge Kavanaugh’s reliance on Hamdi is not helpful because 
the Hamdi plurality opinion did not consider any long-standing practice of the 
President.  The Hamdi Court merely cited Ex parte Quirin for the proposition 
that capture and detention is a universal practice and a fundamental and 
accepted incident to war.175  It has also been argued that Quirin was an 
aberration and should not indicate any executive historical practice.176  Thus, 
neither Judge Kavanaugh nor the Hamdi Court pointed to any long-continued, 
systematic, or unbroken executive branch practice.  In addition, neither Judge 
Kavanaugh nor the Hamdi Court considered whether Congress had acquiesced 
in any practice of the President relating to such detentions.  Thus, Judge 
Kavanaugh stretched the scope of the Court’s review when he stated that the 
Hamdi Court “‘looked to prior Executive Branch practice during wartime to 
inform its interpretation’ of the AUMF.”177 
If one were to apply the standards of a long-continued practice and 
knowing acquiescence by Congress to Al-Bihani’s detention, it would require 
more extensive analysis.  First, a judge should determine whether the executive 
practice of detention during wartime rose to the level of an unbroken practice, 
and then determine whether Congress knowingly acquiesced in such a practice.  
Thus, if Judge Kavanaugh or others seek to rely on custom as a source of 
authority, then more historical analysis than was done in Al-Bihani II should 
take place to thoroughly assess whether a practice is long-continued and 
acquiesced in by Congress. 
 
 174. See, e.g., Legality of Drones Hearings, supra note 11, at 37 (stating that “[i]n appropriate 
circumstances the United States has engaged in targeted killing at least since a border war with 
Mexican bandits in 1916,” in reference to assassination attempts on Poncho Villa by the U.S. 
Army). 
 175. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality opinion) (citing Ex parte 
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28–31 (1942)). 
 176. See LOUIS FISHER, THE CONSTITUTION AND 9/11: RECURRING THREATS TO AMERICA’S 
FREEDOMS 172–82 (2008).  Also, as Justice Scalia noted in his dissenting opinion, Quirin was 
“not [the] Court’s finest hour.”  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 569 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  This was in part 
because the Court upheld the military commission trial of eight German saboteurs “in a brief per 
curiam issued the day after oral argument concluded,” and a “week later the Government carried 
out the commission’s death sentence upon six saboteurs.”  Id. 
 177. Al-Bihani II, 619 F.3d at 42 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 171, at 2085). 
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C. Judicial & Executive Response to Al-Bihani 
Judge Williams, in his concurrence ain Al-Bihani I, agreed with Judge 
Brown and Judge Kavanaugh that the AUMF authorized Al-Bihani’s 
detention.178  However, Judge Williams did not think the majority’s statement 
concerning the applicability of international laws to the AUMF was necessary: 
“[T]here is no need for the court’s pronouncements, divorced from application 
to any particular argument.”179  Williams further indicated that the government 
had argued “that the laws of war have . . . a role to play in the interpretation of 
the AUMF’s grant of authority,” and thus he stated that “the majority’s dictum 
goes well beyond what even the government has argued in this case.”180  It 
would appear that a majority of the judges in Al-Bihani II also considered the 
Al-Bihani I majority’s statements to be dicta.  Their one-paragraph opinion 
denying rehearing en banc noted that they declined “to en banc this case to 
determine the role of international law-of-war principles in interpreting the 
AUMF because, as the various opinions issued in the case indicate, the panel’s 
discussion of that question is not necessary to the disposition of the merits.”181  
Thus, in the view of one scholar, the majority’s denial “amounted to a 
nullification of the more sweeping parts of the [Al-Bihani I] ruling without the 
court bothering to rehear it.”182 
Obama administration lawyers also have not sought to use the Al-Bihani I 
ruling, even though it would give the executive branch more power.183  In fact, 
Obama administration officials have criticized the reasoning of the ruling as 
vulnerable to reversal and have argued that the scope and limits of the AUMF 
are defined by the laws of war as translated to a conflict against terrorists.184  
And, as Judge Kavanaugh himself repeatedly emphasized in Al-Bihani II, “the 
Executive is free to follow international-law principles as a matter of policy,” 
and is “free to adopt legally binding regulations pursuant to statutory 
authorization and may, within the bounds permitted by statute, seek to 
 
 178. See Al-Bihani I, 590 F.3d 866, 883–85 (D. C. Cir. 2010) (Williams, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in judgment). 
 179. Id. at 885. 
 180. Id. at 883, 885. 
 181. 619 F.3d at 1. 
 182. Charlie Savage, Appeals Court Backs Away from War Powers Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
1, 2010, at A21 (citing Stephen I. Vladeck, an American University law professor who filed an 
amicus brief asking the court to rehear the case en banc). 
 183. See Charlie Savage, Obama Team is Divided on Anti-Terror Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
29, 2010, at A1 (noting that Obama administration political appointees David Barron, Harold 
Koh, and Jeh C. Johnson have indicated that the administration should not abandon respect for 
the laws of war); Koh Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International 
Law, supra note 13. 
 184. See Savage, supra note 183, at A21; Koh Address at the Annual Meeting of the 
American Society of International Law, supra note 13. 
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correspond those regulations to international-law principles.”185  However, he 
was clear that he would not “give any legal weight to the Executive’s view” on 
whether the AUMF incorporates international law of war principles since “the 
Judiciary has the final word on the appropriate canons of construction or 
interpretive principles that courts are to employ in construing statutes.”186  For 
Judge Kavanaugh, these “interpretive principles” include the use of custom as 
a source of legal authority when a statute is ambiguous or delegates broad 
powers.187 
The Al-Bihani court’s statements concerning international law will likely 
be considered dicta, and the concurring opinions in the denial for rehearing en 
banc do not have precedential value.188  However, what is left intact is a 
framework in which custom is used to interpret the scope of authority that 
Congress delegated to the executive branch in the AUMF.  This framework is 
also applicable to other broad delegations of power, such as the National 
Security Act of 1947, discussed in the following section, which has been 
asserted as a source of legal authority to support the executive practice of 
targeted killings.189  Thus, Al-Bihani I and II retain persuasive value for judges, 
academics, and government lawyers who seek to rely on custom as a source of 
law in future cases. 
D. Custom as a Source of Law: Targeted Killings & Congressional 
Testimony 
1. Targeted Killings & Congressional Testimony 
William C. Banks, in an April 2010 hearing before the House of 
Representatives Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, 
 
 185. 619 F.3d at 45 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).  For example, 
“Army Field Manuals seek to ensure that the military acts consistently with certain international-
law norms.”  Id.  Judge Kavanaugh also noted “the limited authority of the Judiciary to rely on 
international law to restrict the American war effort does not imply that the political branches 
should ignore or disregard international-law norms.”  Id. at 11.  Instead, the United States is 
“well-advised to take account of international-law principles” since “breaching international 
obligations may trigger serious consequences, such as subjecting the United States to sanctions, 
undermining U.S. standing in the world community, or encouraging retaliation against U.S. 
personnel abroad.”  Id.  Also, “in our constitutional system of separated powers, it is for Congress 
and the President—not the courts—to determine in the first instance whether and how the United 
States will meet its international obligations.”  Id. at 12. 
 186. Id. at 45. 
 187. See id. at 52. 
 188. But see id. at 2 (Brown, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that Al-
Bihani I cannot be considered dicta, but instead must be considered precedent). 
 189. See infra notes 195–206 and accompanying text; Shane, supra note 10, at A1 (discussing 
“targeted killings”). 
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indicated that custom was a source of legal authority for targeted killings.190  In 
his written statements, Banks posed the question: “Just what does distinguish 
lawful targeted killing from unlawful political assassination?”191  For Banks, 
the answer depended on whether the killing occurred during war, peacetime, or 
during the “nontraditional war on terrorism.”192  In the war on terrorism Banks 
found a legal basis for targeted killings in “a domestic law anticipatory self-
defense custom” and “intelligence legislation regulating the activities of the 
CIA.”193  Banks indicated that this law was “not well articulated or 
understood,” but did “supply adequate . . . legal authority for drone strikes.”194 
To make his argument that intelligence legislation supports targeted 
killing, Banks asserted that the National Security Act of 1947 authorized the 
CIA to “perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence 
affecting the national security as the President or National Security Council 
may direct”—what has been commonly referred to as the CIA’s Fifth 
Function.195  “Although, the original grant of authority in 1947 likely did not 
contemplate targeted killing, the 1947 Act was designed as dynamic authority 
 
 190. Legality of Drones Hearings, supra note 11, at 36. 
 191. Id. at 42. 
 192. Id. at 42–43. 
 193. Id. at 40, 43.  Banks’ argument for a “domestic law anticipatory self-defense custom” 
takes the following progression: 
  Under the Constitution, the President may order targeted killing in defense of the 
United States in war.  The President’s authority as Commander in Chief to “repel sudden 
attacks” has traditionally had a real time dimension, or a sort of imminence requirement, 
by analogy to the doctrine of self-defense at international law.  Yet a terrorist attack is 
usually over before it can be repelled in real time, and when the attack is a suicide attack, 
it is impracticable to strike back.  In addition, the United States has learned to expect 
terrorists to pursue a course of continuing attacks against us.  As such, over time a 
domestic law anticipatory self-defense custom has emerged that permits the President to 
use deadly force against a positively identified terrorist if he has exhausted other means of 
apprehending him. 
Id. at 40 (emphasis added) (citing William C. Banks & Peter Raven-Hansen, Targeted Killing and 
Assassination: The U.S. Legal Framework, 37 U. RICH. L. REV.  667, 677–81 (2003) (discussing 
the rubric of anticipatory self-defense within the “twilight zone” of terrorist attacks)). 
 194. Id. at 43.  Others have argued that the United States Constitution and its due process 
provisions apply to the practice of targeted killings.  See Richard Murphy & Afsheen John 
Radsan, Due Process and Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 405, 411 (2009) 
(contending that Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), subjects the U.S. government to due-
process restrictions wherever it acts in the world); see also Legality of Drones Hearings, supra 
note 11, at 39 (arguing before Congress that “[a]t bottom, the right to due process is the right to 
fair and reasonable procedures,” and “for CIA activities, the due process might come from some 
combination of CIA lawyers, the Inspector General, and the review boards within the CIA’s 
clandestine service”). 
 195. Legality of Drones Hearings, supra note 11, at 40 (quoting National Security Act of 
1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, § 102(d)(5), 61 Stat. 495, 498 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 
403–404a(d)(4) (2006))). 
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to be shaped by practice and necessity, and by the 1970s, the practice came to 
include targeted killing.”196  Banks further indicated that Congress has not 
disapproved of targeted killings since the 1970s when Congress tightened their 
oversight of the CIA: 
After the Church Committee197 learned of and disapproved assassination plots 
of the CIA or its agents in the mid-1970s, President Ford issued an executive 
order prohibiting CIA involvement in assassination (but notably not restricting 
targeted killing) and Congress enacted intelligence oversight legislation that, as 
amended, continues to require reporting to Congress by the President of 
significant anticipated intelligence operations.198 
In line with this legislation, Banks further noted that in 1998 the Clinton 
administration authorized the CIA “to use covert means to disrupt and preempt 
terrorist operations planned by Usama bin Laden.”199  This directive was 
affirmed by President Bush before 9/11 and authorized “lethal force for self-
defense.”200  It was under this directive that the United States in 2002 targeted 
and killed an al Qaeda leader and five lower level operatives in the Yemeni 
desert pursuant to an executive finding.201  Thus, Banks contended that, “at 
first blush, the relevant law is the law of intelligence,” which includes the 
Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1974.202  Under this amendment: 
Congress has authorized CIA covert operations if findings are prepared and 
delivered to select members of Congress before the operation described, or in a 
“timely fashion” thereafter.  So long as intelligence committees are kept “fully 
and currently informed,” the intelligence laws permit the President broad 
discretion to utilize the nation’s intelligence agencies to carry out national 
security operations, implicitly including targeted killing.203 
Banks further asserted that a targeted killing operation “would follow 
intelligence law as an ‘operation in foreign countries, other than activities 
intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence,’ and thus presumably 
would be conducted pursuant to statutory authority.”204 
 
 196. Id. (emphasis added). 
 197. The Church Committee was created by Congress in 1976 to investigate alleged U.S. 
involvement in assassination plots.  Banks & Raven-Hansen, supra note 193, at 701. 
 198. Legality of Drones Hearings, supra note 11, at 40–41. 
 199. Id. at 41. 
 200. Id. at 41–42. 
 201. Id. at 38, 41–42. 
 202. Id. at 42 (citing Hughes-Ryan Amendment, Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 32, 88 Stat. 1795, 
1804 (1974) (repealed 1991)).  Banks further stated that “[t]he amendment was a component of 
reforms in intelligence operations law designed to make U.S. covert operations decisions directly 
accountable to the decision makers.”  Id. at 42 n. 18. 
 203. Id. at 42 (citing Banks & Raven-Hansen, supra note 193, at 713). 
 204. Legality of Drones Hearings, supra note 11, at 42 (citing quoting Hughes-Ryan 
Amendment § 32). 
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Banks’ view is confirmed by Kenneth Anderson, who also testified before 
the same House subcommittee.205  In his statements, Anderson asserted that 
“[t]he lawfulness of the CIA’s [targeted killing] operations under US domestic 
law is not at issue,” because the CIA “has been tasked by direct orders of the 
President, under the authority of a complex statute that provides for oversight 
and accountability within and between the political branches.”206 
2. Evaluating the Use of Custom as a Source of Law for Targeted 
Killings 
In their testimony before Congress (and in their other writings), both 
Banks and Anderson assessed Congress’ broad delegations of authority under 
the 1947 National Security Act.207  In making their arguments, Banks and 
Anderson relied on executive branch historical practice and congressional 
acquiescence in those practices (or custom) as a source of legal authority for 
determining whether the CIA’s practice of targeted killings is legitimate under 
U.S. law.208  Are their conclusions supported by the Supreme Court’s 
 
 205. Id. at 7–17 (testimony of Kenneth Anderson, Washington College of Law, American 
University). 
 206. Id. at 11.  In other writings, Anderson finds that the National Security Act of 1947 that 
created the CIA and granted it authority to engage in intelligence activities also authorized the 
performance of “additional services of common concern and such other functions and duties 
related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President and the National Security 
Council may direct.”  Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and 
Law (manuscript at 21) (Brookings Inst., Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. & Hoover Inst., Working 
Paper 2009) (internal quotations omitted), available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/ 
0511_counterterrorism_anderson.aspx.  Anderson finds that while the “reference to other 
functions and duties . . . is deliberately obscure,” the breadth of known incidents under these 
words is “sufficient to suggest that the executive branch has interpreted the legislative mandate 
broadly and Congress has regularly acquiesced.”  Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotations 
omitted).  “Whether rightly or wrongly, justly or unjustly,” Anderson writes, “the United States 
has often used force, not under color of law enforcement or in the context of IHL armed conflicts 
to which the U.S. was a party, but instead under domestic statutory authority.”  (manuscript at 
22).  After reviewing Congressional reforms to intelligence legislation, Anderson concluded: 
Notwithstanding the reforms that have strengthened Congressional oversight and other 
watchdog functions over the past several decades, nothing in the basic statutory 
arrangement challenges this fundamental assumption that U.S. domestic law permits in 
certain circumstances the uses of force, including targeted killing, by civilian agents of the 
government in circumstances that implicate self-defense under international law but do 
not necessarily constitute an IHL armed conflict. 
Id.; see also Peyton Cooke, Bringing the Spies in from the Cold: Legal Cosmopolitanism and 
Intelligence Under the Laws of War, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 601, 646–47 (2010) (making similar 
arguments to Anderson and citing Dames & Moore for the conclusion that covert activities are 
“well within historical tradition” and would receive support from authoritative Supreme Court 
precedent). 
 207. See supra Part II.D.1. 
 208. See supra Part II.D.1. 
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customary law standards of (1) an executive practice long-pursued and (2) 
Congress’ knowing acquiescence in such a practice?209 
In other writings, Banks conducted this analysis and stated that CIA 
involvement in assassination in the years before 1974 may or may not have 
been a “systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued.”210  But, “[f]or 
the purposes of establishing customary law, . . . it cannot be said that 
congressional acquiescence was knowing.”211  This is because “[t]he system 
for congressional oversight of CIA activities, including covert operations, 
helped assure that Congress as a whole did not know what the CIA was 
doing.”212  “Thus, the CIA activities of the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s 
cannot be supported by customary law.”213  However, Banks argued that later 
intelligence legislation contributed to recognition by Congress that authority 
for covert action existed and was supported by a dynamic construction of the 
National Security Act of 1947’s Fifth Function activities.214  “The dynamic 
construction of the Fifth Function permitted the development of customary law 
to support the covert action capability, in part because Congress was informed 
at least generally concerning such activities.”215  Thus, Congress’ “knowing 
acquiescence may extend to targeted killing.”216  Banks does not definitively 
conclude that Congress has acquiesced in targeted killings.  However, as 
evidenced by his statements before Congress, Banks found support for targeted 
killings within the structure of complex intelligence laws governing 
congressional oversight of CIA action.217 
Banks appears to honestly evaluate whether there is an executive practice 
long-pursued and whether Congress has acquiesced in such a practice.  
However, his analysis is subject to the general criticisms of inferring intent 
from the inaction or silence of a subsequent Congress. 
First, improper weight is placed on the inaction or silence of subsequent 
Congresses when interpreting the meaning of the original enactment of the 
National Security Act in 1947.  Banks argued that the 1947 Act was “designed 
 
 209. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 210. Banks & Raven-Hansen, supra note 193, at 708 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. 
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 709.  Banks and Raven-Hansen provide a fuller discussion of these conclusions 
within their article.  See id. at 699–705, 708–09. 
 214. Id. at 712. 
 215. Id. at 713. 
 216. Banks & Raven-Hansen, supra note 193, at 713.  These authors further argue that 
subsequent legislation has increased Congressional knowledge of covert activities and that 
subsequent domestic laws have not forbidden targeted killings.  Id. at 726–33. 
 217. See Legality of Drones Hearings, supra note 11, at 42–43. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] AL-BIHANI V. OBAMA & CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 611 
as dynamic authority to be shaped by practice and necessity.”218  While Banks 
does evaluate the intent of the enacting legislature, it becomes evident that this 
intent is presumed to continue to later legislatures based on their silence.  For 
example, when interpreting the amendments to the National Security Act of 
1947, such as the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, Banks presumes that subsequent 
legislatures also wanted a dynamic construction of the Fifth Function activities 
based on congressional silence and the absence of changes made to the 1947 
Act.219 
Also, Banks presented a view of the legislative history of intelligence 
legislation that ultimately supported a finding that targeted killing is warranted 
under this law.220  While this might be a valid conclusion, it is not a 
straightforward one, and thus there could be a reading of the legislative history 
that would support a different conclusion.  For example, is the mere fact that 
the Church Committee investigated CIA assassinations a statement that 
Congress would not want a dynamic interpretation of the Fifth Function 
supporting the CIA’s involvement in the practice of targeted killing?  
Regardless, it appears that Banks’ view of the legislative history rests on the 
absence of congressional action.  Thus, to borrow from Koh’s analysis of 
Dames & Moore, Banks construes the “history of unchecked executive 
practice, the fact of [the National Security Act of 1947’s] existence, and the 
absence of express congressional disapproval of the president’s [findings 
concerning lethal force] to demonstrate that Congress had impliedly authorized 
the act.”221 
Furthermore, it is clear that any acquiescence or implied authorization of 
Congress rests on making inferences.  Making such inferences for “a large 
collection of people, especially when their decisionmaking is as structured as 
that in Congress,”222 is especially dangerous in light of the fact that the 
intelligence findings of Congress are not shared with Congress as a whole, but 
with small groups within Congress.  Thus, for this reason, and based on the 
general structure of Congress discussed earlier,223 it is far more likely that there 
will be inaction concerning intelligence legislation than there will be changes 
to such legislation.  Yet, as is indicated in the following section, one hopes 
Congress will speak clearly concerning the executive practices of detentions 
and targeted killings of suspected terrorists. 
 
 218. Id. at 40 (emphasis added). 
 219. See id. at 40–41. 
 220. Id. at 40–42. 
 221. KOH, supra note 3, at 139. 
 222. Eskridge, supra note 134, at 98. 
 223. See supra text accompanying notes 138–41. 
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E. Congressional Response to Al-Bihani & Targeted Killings 
1. A Benefit to Court Decisions Based on Custom as a Source of Law 
There are many reasons to criticize the use of custom as a source of legal 
authority. However, there is a benefit for court decisions based on historical 
executive branch practice because they do not require courts to make decisions 
that rely on the Constitution.224  “Because an acquiescence argument is both 
context-specific and contingent on continuing congressional approval, its 
acceptance by the Court does not create so troubling a precedent as does an 
endorsement of a new category of ‘inherent’ executive power . . . .”225  Thus, if 
courts find congressional acquiescence in an executive practice, it “allows the 
courts to minimize their articulation of constitutional precedent, which only the 
Supreme Court or the amendment process can change.  And, if the courts 
misread congressional assent to an executive practice, Congress may legislate 
to alter or stop it.”226  For example, Congress eventually retracted the authority 
for executive withdrawal of land (the issue in Midwest Oil) in 1976.227 
This benefit is applicable to arguments that rely on custom as a source of 
law for detention (Al-Bihani I and II) or for targeted killing (Banks and 
Anderson’s congressional testimony).  If the Court were to make a decision 
based on the President’s Article II powers, then it could only be changed by a 
subsequent Supreme Court decision or the amendment process.228  But, if a 
court later found justification for targeted killings based on executive practice 
and congressional acquiescence under the AUMF and subsequent 
congressional silence, then Congress could “legislate to alter or stop” such 
practices.229  Regardless of this benefit, it is hoped that Congress would not 
seek to react to a court decision or an executive act, but would proactively 
 
 224. For example, a court could determine, as Judge Kavanaugh argued, that the executive 
branch has authority under Article II to detain individuals in wartime.  Al-Bihani II, 619 F.3d 1, 
52 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).  However, as 
indicated in Harold Koh’s address, the Obama administration has not relied on the President’s 
inherent Commander-in-Chief power under Article II as a basis for detention.  Koh, supra note 
13. 
 225. BRUFF, supra note 3, at 104.  Bruff further noted that “[a] finding of acquiescence, 
which ordinarily mixes in statutory elements, is less momentous than creation of a precedent 
based solely on the Constitution, because it leaves open an avenue of retreat for Court and 
Congress alike.”  Id. at 105. 
 226. Id. at 104. 
 227. See Federal Lands Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 704(a), 
90 Stat. 2743, 2792 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1784) (2006).  In this Act, 
Congress provided that “the implied authority of the President to make withdrawals and 
reservations resulting from acquiescence of the Congress . . . [is] repealed.”  Id. (citing United 
States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915)). 
 228. See BRUFF, supra note 3, at 104. 
 229. Id. at 104. 
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legislate concerning the executive practices of detention and targeted killings 
in the current war on terror. 
2. Congress Should Not Silently Acquiesce in the War on Terror 
In Al-Bihani I, Judge Brown herself questioned whether the “court-driven 
process is best suited to protecting both the rights of petitioners and the safety 
of our nation,” because the “common law process depends on incrementalism 
and eventual correction, and it is most effective where there are a significant 
number of cases brought before a large set of courts, which in turn enjoy the 
luxury of time to work the doctrine supple”—factors that Judge Brown does 
not think exist in the context of Guantanamo habeas’ detentions.230  Judge 
Brown maintained though that Congress should legislate in this area: 
But the circumstances that frustrate the judicial process are the same ones that 
make this situation particularly ripe for Congress to intervene pursuant to its 
policy expertise, democratic legitimacy, and oath to uphold and defend the 
Constitution.  These cases present hard questions and hard choices, ones best 
faced directly.  Judicial review, however, is just that: re-view, an indirect and 
necessarily backward looking process.  And looking backward may not be 
enough in this new war.231 
William Banks also asked Congress to legislate concerning the war against 
terrorism.232  In his testimony before Congress, he contended that 
“[c]ontemporary laws have not kept up with changes in the dynamics of 
military conflicts,” and nowhere is this “more glaring than in its treatment of 
targeted killing.”233  “The United States now finds itself engaged in military 
conflicts with non-state groups, and such conflicts were not the subject of the 
extensive international framework for warfare negotiated after the World 
Wars,” and “[t]hese new battlefields require adaptation of old laws, domestic 
and international.”234  Thus, “Congress would do all of us an important favor 
 
 230. 590 F.3d 866, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Brown, J., concurring). 
 231. Id. at 882.  Judge Brown further stated that: 
  War is a challenge to law, and the law must adjust.  It must recognize that the old 
wineskins of international law, domestic criminal procedure, or other prior frameworks 
are ill-suited to the bitter wine of this new warfare.  We can no longer afford diffidence.  
This war has placed us not just at, but already past the leading edge of a new and 
frightening paradigm, one that demands new rules be written.  Falling back on the comfort 
of prior practices supplies only illusory comfort. 
Id. 
 232. Legality of Drones Hearings, supra note 11, at 43. 
 233. Id. at 45. 
 234. Id. at 46.  Banks also noted that his “testimony has shown how the legal authority to 
permit and regulate targeted killing may be found within the existing legal corpus.”  Id.  
However, he admitted that “the foundational authorities are not well formed, and there has been 
little deliberative attention to modernizing the law to reflect the modern battlefield.”  Id. 
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by devoting attention to articulating policy and legal criteria for the use of 
force against non-state terrorists.”235 
In Al-Bihani II, Judge Kavanaugh set up a framework which looked to 
executive practices during previous wartimes when interpreting the AUMF.236  
In testimony before Congress, it was asserted that the AUMF and the 1947 
National Security Act provided support for the executive practice of targeted 
killing.237  Thus, using custom as a source of law, both the court in Al-Bihani II 
and Banks argue that Congress has impliedly authorized executive practices 
through its silent acquiescence.  In response to such arguments, Congress could 
either remain silent and acquiesce, or it could legislate to alter or stop 
executive practices currently carried out under the alleged authority of the 
AUMF and the National Security Act of 1947.  If Congress takes the first 
option, they might find themselves reacting to court decisions that invoke 
custom as a source of law in later years.  Under the second option, Congress 
could proactively implement legislation that governs detention and targeted 
killings adapted to the terrorist networks operating in the world today.238  Such 
congressional action would preclude any arguments that Congress has 
acquiesced in the executive practices of detention and targeted killings.  One 
hopes Congress will not remain silent. 
CONCLUSION 
Reliance upon custom as a source of law is “inevitably backward-
looking”239 since it evaluates (1) whether an executive practice is long-
continued, systematic, and unbroken and (2) whether Congress has knowingly 
acquiesced in such a practice.  An honest assessment of these two requirements 
that does not manipulate the history of the executive practice or the history of 
congressional action (or inaction) is necessary if courts seek to follow Supreme  
 
 235. Id. 
 236. See supra Part II.B.1.b. 
 237. See supra Part II.D.1. 
 238. For example, Congress could delineate the precise scope of what is permitted under the 
“necessary and appropriate” phrase of the AUMF.  See Authorization for Use of Military Force, 
Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 cmt. (2006)). 
 239. See Glennon, supra note 4, at 148. 
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Court precedent faithfully.  Such assessment, however, would be unnecessary if 
Congress took the forward-looking approach by establishing legal criteria for 
detentions and targeted killings in the war on terror. 
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